NATO Without the US: Can Europe’s Militaries Deter Russia Alone?
European members of NATO would need to significantly strengthen their military capabilities if they were forced to defend themselves without U.S. support. According to a 2025 joint analysis by the think tanks Bruegel and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, this would require adding at least 300,000 troops to standing forces and increasing defense spending beyond 3.5 percent of GDP—equivalent to at least €250 billion. It would also involve rebuilding and integrating Europe’s defense industrial base, and doing so quickly.
The report warns that even with around 80,000 U.S. troops stationed across 30 bases in Europe, along with America’s rapid deployment capabilities, Russia could test NATO’s unity within the next three to ten years.
At the same time, the once-unthinkable idea of the United States stepping back from NATO is now being discussed more seriously. President Donald Trump, a long-time critic of the alliance, has called for a “very serious examination” of NATO, particularly after member states declined to support U.S. actions in the Iran conflict or join its naval blockade in the Arabian Sea.
Trump has warned that Europe could face serious consequences without U.S. leadership and backing. While a full withdrawal would likely require congressional approval, his remarks have already triggered debate on both sides of the Atlantic about reshaping NATO and shifting more responsibility onto European nations.
European allies are now actively considering a “NATO without the U.S.” scenario. The discussion has been fueled by Trump’s calls for greater European support for Ukraine, his controversial stance toward allies, and concerns about the long-term reliability of American commitments to the alliance.
Since the post-Cold War era, particularly during former President Barack Obama’s administration, Americans have raised concerns about NATO’s effectiveness and commitment. At the same time, European allies have questioned Donald Trump’s reliability in upholding the alliance’s treaty obligations.
In response to Trump’s call for NATO members to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense, allies reached a compromise at the 2025 NATO summit. They agreed to allocate 3.5 percent of GDP to military spending—roughly in line with U.S. levels—and an additional 1.5 percent toward infrastructure improvements, including cybersecurity, crisis response systems, and upgrading transport networks such as roads, railways, bridges, and ports for military use.
Ukraine’s Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte addressed the media during a press statement at NATO headquarters in Brussels on October 15, 2025. Even before recent developments, U.S. pressure on Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defense had already become a priority across many European capitals following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Muscle and Money
A joint analysis by Bruegel and the Kiel Institute highlights the scale of what Europe would need to defend itself without the United States. Europe’s armed forces currently total about 1.5 million troops, but a Europe-only defense against a potential Russian invasion would require at least 300,000 additional soldiers—equivalent to roughly 50 more brigades.
In terms of equipment, the report estimates that Europe would need a minimum of 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles, and 700 artillery systems, along with more than one million 155mm shells—enough to sustain just three months of high-intensity combat. This level of expansion would surpass the combined capabilities of the French, German, Italian, and British militaries today.
And these requirements apply only to ground forces.
To match Russia’s wartime production capacity—even accounting for its losses in Ukraine—Europe would need to coordinate defense procurement, standardize weapons systems, unify logistics, and integrate military units across countries. It would also need to replace U.S. troops currently stationed in Europe, including rotational deployments in strategic areas such as the Suwalki Corridor between Poland and Lithuania, while potentially establishing additional bases in countries like Moldova and Romania.
Analysts say these challenges highlight the complexity of a “NATO without the U.S.” scenario. As European nations take on a larger defense role, U.S. forces would, in turn, need to adjust by compensating for the capabilities and specialized skills currently provided by their European allies.
June Teufel Dreyer, a politics professor at the University of Miami and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said that non-U.S. NATO forces are generally well-trained and supported by capable defense industries.
She noted that major European defense companies such as Thales and Leonardo would likely welcome increased domestic investment. However, she cautioned that these firms also understand that sustained funding is uncertain without large-scale, consistent orders—particularly from the U.S. military. For example, she pointed out that producing around 2,000 long-range loitering munitions, or drones, each year to match Russia’s output would require reliable financial commitments that may not be guaranteed.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s European nations would need to bolster standing militaries by at least 300,000 troops and significantly boost defense spending beyond 3.5 percent of gross domestic product—at least 250 billion euros—while reviving and integrating their industrial base to defend themselves against Russia without the United States.
And they’d need to do that fast, according to a 2025 joint analysis by European think tanks Bruegel and the Kiel Institute for World Economy.
They warn that even with 80,000 American soldiers and airmen stationed on 30 bases on the continent—and the United States’ capacity to rapidly deploy forces—Moscow will test NATO’s resolve “within three to 10 years.”
The once-inconceivable prospect of the United States withdrawing from NATO is now a possibility. President Donald Trump—never a fan of the 32-nation coalition the Pentagon has spearheaded since 1949—has called for a “very serious examining” of the alliance, after its members failed to respond to his appeal to assist in the Iran war or join the U.S. Navy’s Arabian Sea blockade of Iranian shipping.
Trump has vowed Europeans could face a “reckoning” without American leadership and support. Such a departure would require unlikely congressional approval, but the president’s statements are sparking discussion on both sides of the Atlantic about a restructuring of the alliance that would require Europeans to shoulder more of NATO’s burden.
As widely reported, European allies are actively discussing and preparing for a “NATO minus U.S.” scenario. The idea originated in response to Trump’s demand for Europeans to bulk up support for Ukraine in fighting off Russia’s invasion, his threats to seize Greenland from Denmark, and his characterization of member states as “cowards” unlikely to uphold NATO’s commitments.
While Americans have questioned NATO’s post-Cold War resolve since former President Barack Obama’s administration, Europeans in turn have questioned Trump’s reliability in meeting treaty obligations.
In response to Trump’s demand that NATO allies commit 5 percent of GDP to defense, members agreed during the alliance’s 2025 summit to commit 3.5 percent to their militaries—roughly matching the percent of GDP the U.S. spends on its armed forces—and 1.5 percent for infrastructure improvements, such as cybersecurity, crisis response, and adapting roads, rail lines, bridges, and ports to military needs.
Muscle and Money
The Bruegel/Kiel Institute analysis documents Europe’s armies have a combined force of about 1.5 million troops. In order to withstand a hypothetical Russian invasion, a European-only force would need 300,000 more infantry soldiers, or roughly 50 more brigades, than it had in 2025. It would need a minimum of 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles, and 700 artillery pieces with more than 1 million 155 mm shells—the minimum for three months of combat, the Bruegel/Kiel Institute analysis states.
That boost in manpower and armaments would exceed the current French, German, Italian, and British forces combined.
And that’s just ground forces.
To match Russian war-footing military production—even with Ukraine attrition—a Europe-only military would need collective arms procurement, common armaments, unified logistics, and integrated military units. Such an army would need to replace stationed U.S. forces and rotational deployments within the 65-mile Suwalki Corridor between Poland and Lithuania, while also establishing bases in Moldova and Romania.
These are but a few of the challenges a “NATO minus the U.S.” would face, military analysts and international relations scholars told The Epoch Times. And as Europeans by necessity assumed a more robust posture on the continent, American forces would need to compensate for the loss of specialties and skills brought by their European allies.
European giants such as Thales and Leonardo would “surely be attracted by the idea of more indigenous investment,” Dreyer said. But, she added, European defense contractors “also know the funds they need aren’t guaranteed” without orders from the U.S. military to, for instance, annually build 2,000 “long-range loitering munitions”—drones—to match Russia’s numbers.
“The French and the Germans build highly thought of diesel-electric submarines; Sweden produces great fighter planes,” Dreyer said.
But from a nuclear deterrent perspective, a U.S. departure from NATO is problematic. Dreyer pointed to British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s June 2025 announcement that Britain would buy at least 12 U.S.-made F-35s to “enhance the interoperability of NATO defense” in its nuclear posture, since these jets would be the UK’s only nuclear deterrent beyond its submarine force. The stealth fighter is the first to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons.
U.S. and European allies’ coordination in defense procurement and production “saves money and the R&D costs for the most advanced weapons,” she said, noting while the projected cost for the sixth-generation F-47 is $4.4 billion, but it is a shared NATO expense.
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